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THE ROLE OF NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV'S 1959 VISIT TO THE US
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS
Tatyana I. Puchkova, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1999
The end of the Cold War brought the uncertainty of
the future relationship between the US and the countries
of the former communist bloc.

The major component of

the prognosis is the analysis of the factors that deter
mined the policies and the directions of the Cold War.
The visit of the Soviet Premier to the US marked a
turning point in the Cold War mentality of the two na
tions.

This paper will attempt to prove that the visit

was a unique and revolutionary event in the course of
the confrontation, and yet a logical continuation of
earlier developments in the international arena.
This thesis is largely based on the unique inter
views of people close to Khrushchev in the 1950s, who
share their personal accounts of the personality of
soviet leader and its effect on the political realities
of that time.

INTRODUCTION
In this day and age one would be hard pressed to
disagree that the main political phenomenon of this cen
tury was the Cold War.

Lasting for almost fifty years

and to different degrees involving most countries of the
world, it determined foreign and domestic policies, con
sumed enormous economic resources, created its own cultural stereotypes, and changed the balance of power in
the world.

In the short run it put the world on the

brink of war, imposed new political orientations on the
developing nations, produced the most dangerous concen
tration of the weapons of mass destruction humanity has
ever seen and caused international paranoia of global
magnitude.

In the long run, it contributed to the down

fall of one of the two leading political systems and ide
ologies, provoked a series of civil wars on several con
tinents, opened new, challenging technological horizons
for mankind, and most importantly, became a difficult
lesson in preventing a global war and as such, revolu
tionized world political practices.
1

As the initiators and the main forces of the Cold
War, the USA and the Soviet Union were primarily respon
sible for the policies, events and changes that occurred
in the world during the last half century.

The length of

the Cold War by no means implies the consistency of these
policies or of the relationship that existed between the
key players.

These policies and relationships made many

unexpected and illogical turns due to various real or
perceived factors.

There were several unilateral and mu

tual attempts to revise the underlying factors of the
Cold War and to improve the world climate.

Eventually

this would lead to the "global warming" and the end of
the decades-long confrontation.

But the first main thaw

without a doubt occurred during the administration of
American President Dwight Eisenhower, and Soviet Premier
Nikita Khruschev.
The relationship and contribution of these two world
leaders remains yet to be fully understood and evaluated.
Technically speaking, their efforts to reach agreements
on a number of crucially important issues of the Cold War
failed.

Most of the international problems they were

trying to resolve remained a bone of contention long af
ter they left the political arena.

The arms race contin-

ued to dominate Soviet and American politics for several
more decades.

The two sides remained hostile to each

other for thirty more years.

Moreover, largely because

of these efforts, Khrushchev himself was removed from
power.

Both he and Eisenhower left office disappointed

with their inability to change the course of history.
And yet they did change history in ways that could
seem strange and illogical at the time, inconsistent or
insufficient later, but that turned out to be the main
breakthrough in the US-USSR relations in the Cold War.
The official visit of Khrushchev to the US in 1959 falls
into this category of Cold War phenomena.

The visit pio

neered peaceful and even friendly negotiations between
two antagonist ideological systems.

The very fact that

in 1959 Khrushchev, "Communist #1" 1 was invited by
Eisenhower to come to the US to "meet America" was a
revolutionary step that heralded the beginning of a new
era in the World politics, even though it failed to se
cure immediate change.

Under the circumstances both the

invitation and its acceptance were courageous steps on
part of Eisenhower and Khrushchev.
1

One has to know the

An expression widely used in the Western press when re
ferring to N. Khrushchev.

culture of suspicion, propaganda, fear and horrendous mu
tual misconceptions that existed between the two hostile
systems in order to understand the value of Khrushchev's
visit to the USA in 1959.

He was not only the first So

viet or Russian leader ever to visit the US, he was also
the representative of the USA's main ideological foe, the
USSR, the very existence of which wasn't recognized by
the US for almost two decades. 2

The role of this visit was multi-faceted.

It de-

stroyed many stereotypes that the two governments and na
tions had of each other, and it confirmed some of them.
It gave the Soviet delegation and Khrushchev personally
new technological, economic and even political ideas and
it gave the US a rare glimpse into the Soviet mentality.
More importantly, it provided a first real face-to-face
conversation between the two mortal enemies.
proved that enemies could converse.

And it

It also left no

doubt on either side that they had to converse and that
preserving peace was a task as urgently necessary as it
was difficult to accomplish.

The US recognized the Soviet State in 1933, 16 years af
ter it appeared in 1917 and 11 years after the formation
of the USSR in 1922.
2

At the same time, the visit couldn't have occurred
without the political atmosphere being ripe for change.
The gasp of fresh air the Soviet Union desperately needed
after Stalin's death, the escalation of international
tension over the division of Germany; the growing
strength of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the diffi
culty in financing the arms race for both sides were just
some of the factors that made the visit necessary.

And

the personalities of the two elderly leaders, who fought
in the World War II and who turned to be more insightful
than most politicians at the time, made it possible.
This paper will attempt to prove that the visit of
Nikita Khrushchev to the USA in 1959 was a unique and
revolutionary event in the course of the Cold War, and
yet a logical continuation of some earlier developments
in Soviet-American relations.

It will also show that the

ideas and feelings born, observed, and discussed during
the visit marked a significant change in the attitudes
and interactions between socialist and capitalist worlds
in general, and the USSR and the USA, in particular.

PART ONE
HISTORIC BAGGAGE

6

CHAPTER I
THE FREEZE
To understand the policies, actions and relationships of the Cold War at its peak, one has to understand
the mindset of that time as well as the roots thereof.
The Soviet State emerged in 1917 as a result of a major
social revolution.

One of the main beliefs of its phi-

losophy was the inevitability of struggle between social
classes and the consistent attempt of the "haves" to
crush the "have nots" on a worldwide scale.

Conse-

quently, the main concern of the socialist state was re
pelling the attacks of the "world bourgeoisie" 3 and consistently watching for treason and revolt both within and
outside of the country.
Unfortunately, reality provided ample evidence for
the validity of this view.

Not only was the Soviet power

immersed in a most bloody civil war, but the military in-

A cliche widely used in the Soviet Russia from 1917 un
til the late 1980s.
3

7

8

tervention of international Entente forces dissipated any
doubts about the position of the Western countries. 4

The

response of the Soviet power was the establishment of a
dictatorial regime that closed the country and invested
enormous efforts into creating the powerful military and
the major industries that would support it.
After Stalin assumed absolute power in the USSR in
1929 an atmosphere of overwhelming paranoia and suspicion
shrouded the country.

The "father of the nations" 5 took

several further crucial steps and added to the Marxist
Leninist doctrine his thesis that the development of so
cialism would be challenged by the continuously growing
resistance of the opposition, the latter often elabo
rately concealed.

This sincere belief provided the rea-

son for mass repressions, and after becoming a doctrine,
justified arbitrary abuses.
Tragically, history soon supported this view again.
When in 1941 Germany attacked the Soviet Union, Stalin
made the Soviet people forget Hitler's socialist affilia4

The Entente forces intervened into Soviet Russia in
1918 in an attempt to crush the Socialist Revolution.
A cliche used in the USSR during Stalin's rule to
praise him for his supposedly wise ethnic policies within
the Soviet Union.
5

He

tion and the signing of the 1939 Non-Aggression Pact.
presented Hitler's aggression to the nation as one more
imperialist attempt to crush the young socialist state,
and more than ever, the country had to unite and be on
constant alert.
The war became an experience of tremendous impor
tance for the Soviet Union.

Among other things, it also

had a significant effect on Soviet perceptions of the
West.

First of all, for the first time the USSR did not

see Western countries as monolithic.· Britain, France and
the US fought against Germany on the side of the Soviet
State.

That in itself was a new and somewhat bewildering

turn of events.

Secondly, for the first time Soviet sol

diers came into direct contact with the outside world.
Many of them crossed half of Europe and saw both the dif
ferences and the similarities between the Soviet Union
and other countries.

They also met European and American

soldiers and found humanity, normality, and even friend
liness in many of them.
But the aftertaste of the war had many flavors.

The

Soviet nation was bitter about the perceived treason of
the Western allies and their unwillingness sooner to open
the second front at the time when Soviet soldiers were

9

dying in battles by thousands every day.

6

By 1945 the

USSR had lost over 20 million people in the war and more
than twice that many in internal repressions.

The nation

was exhausted and more than anything needed peace and
stability.

The Soviets also believed in their blood-

earned right to be major decision-makers in the post-war
Europe.

After freeing Eastern Europe from the Nazis and

occupying Berlin, the USSR was determined to play a cen
tral role in the future of the region.

At the same time,

the Soviet government knew that the role would come at a
high price.

The announcement of the USA's possession of

the atomic bomb and the horrifying way in which the US
proved it by destroying civilian targets in Japan sent a
wave of shock throughout the world.

This demonstration

of might combined with the problems of power sharing in
Europe and other historic reasons mentioned above, convinced the Soviet leaders and the nation that the West
was going to use military strength as the main leverage
in international politics.

As far as the Soviet Union

was concerned, it was facing the choice of becoming an
even stronger military giant or perishing in the confronDespite the promises of the Western Allies for an ear
lier invasion, the second front was opened in 1944.
6

10

11

tation.
Besides the objective political reasons, the personalities of the Soviet and the American leader played a
great role in the unfolding policy of fear.

Extremely

suspicious in general, Stalin interpreted every occurrence as gravely dangerous and implemented the most in
adequately serious measures to defend himself and the
country.
Churchill's speech in 1946 at Fulton, USA,
calling upon the West to unite in resisting communism,
was one of such occurrences. In the words of Khrushchev,
It was largely because of Churchill's speech that
Stalin exaggerated our enemies' strength and their
intention to unleash war on us. As a result he
became obsessed with shoring up our defenses
against the West. Stalin remembered that it was
Churchill who, before World War II, called the
Soviet Union a "colossus on feet of clay" and
thus encouraged Hitler to hurl his troops against
our country, promising him an easy victory...As
far as Stalin was concerned, Churchill's speech
marked a return to prewar attitudes (Khrushchev
1974, 2: 355).
The fact that Churchill chose his visit to the US to
announce the necessity of resisting socialism, left no
doubts in the Soviet Union that European countries were
looking up to the US for leadership in the struggle with
the USSR.

After that speech the Soviet Union dropped all

pretense of friendship with the former allies.

7

Stalin

was convinced that the West was deliberately creating
tensions and assumed that the war was inevitable.

In ad-

dition, the personality and political line of the US
President Truman contributed to the escalation of the
confrontation.

He was blatantly anti-communist and, un

like Roosevelt, inexperienced in diplomacy.

He bluntly

stated his uncompromising position towards the Soviet Un
ion and seemed to be guided mostly by populist emotions,
rather than serious long-term political calculations.
The proclamation of the Truman doctrine of containment of
communism "by the adroit and vigilant application of
counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geo
graphic points" 8 and its practical application in the
form of American involvement in the Korean war marked the
beginning of open hostility between the two political
systems.
The 1949 formation of NATO that included the US,
Canada and ten Western European nations became a model
7

8

Sergey Khrushchev, interview by G. Colburn, 1991.

These are the words of US diplomat George Kennan who
presented the idea of containment in the journal Foreign
Affairs in 1947. That same year it was officially an
nounced by Harry Truman.

12

for military alliances the US organized with Mediterra
nean nations in the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)
and with the nations of Southeast Asia in SEATO. By the
1950s, the United States had a string of allies around
the world that all but enclosed the USSR and its satel
lite nations.
However, the major concrete issue that stood between
the West and the USSR at that time was the political
status of post-war Germany.

In accordance with the deci

sion of the Potsdam Conference, the Allies temporarily
divided Germany and Berlin, located in the Soviet zone,
into four spheres of influence until the economy normal
ized and Germany became a viable independent country.
The decision of the Western countries to unite their
zones and introduce the new currency there in 1948 led to
an unforeseen response of the Soviet Union.

The calcula-

tion of the Western Allies' was that the USSR was too
devastated in the war to get involved in another military
confrontation over the division of Germany. 9

At the same

time, the Soviet Union well understood that by surrender
ing its positions in Germany to the West it would jeopJohn Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War
II (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1960),
145-149.
9

13

ardize newly socialized countries in Eastern Europe and
the whole idea of socialist victory in the world. 10

The

USSR responded with a blockade of the Western sectors of
Berlin, which its former Allies masterfully defeated by
carrying on superbly coordinated airlifts to the city. 11
By now both sides had plenty of justifications for their
actions and the reasons to accuse each other of violating
international agreements.
The blockade didn't change the status quo.

The two

de-facto German states continued to exist, one capitalist
that evolved out of the three Western zones, the other
socialist that emerged out of the Socialist zone.

By

1949 they respectively became the Federal Republic of
Germany and the German Democratic Republic.

In 1949 the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed and in 1955
FRG became a member.

The Soviet Union saw the NATO mili

tary bloc and, especially, the inclusion of FRG in it as
the direct violation of Potsdam agreement and one more
indication of the militaristic intentions of the US-led
10
11

S. Khrushchev, 1991.

On June 24, 1948 the USSR cut off all traffic into
the Western sector of Berlin. The Western allies began
an airlift of supplies to Berlin. On September 30, 1949
the USSR lifted the blockade.

14

West.

12

By the 1950s, the tension became extreme.

The

Soviet Union felt especially vulnerable because it was
surrounded with the Western military bases and because
the USA seemed to be winning in the arms race.

Soviet

propaganda accused the West of inflaming military intentions and pushing the world into a new war.
In the US the situation was tragically similar.
Since 1947 the Soviet Union also had an atomic bomb and
was rapidly accumulating weapons.

Soviet resolve in Ger

many and Eastern Europe made it clear to the Western pow
ers that the USSR was preparing for the war as well.
Paradoxically, as it turned out much later, neither government was planning to attack but was absolutely con
vinced that such was the intention of the other side.
The McCarthy anti-communist paranoia and witch-hunt in
the US created an atmosphere of hysteria comparable to
that in the USSR.

Rehearsing putting gas masks on and

learning to blindly hate the other side became common
features of life in both countries.

The era of the Cold

War unfolded and it was taking on the life of its own.

12

Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1974), 501-509.

15

CHAPTER II
THE THAW
In 1953 Stalin died leaving not only the nation but
also the world at the crossroads.

The leader who had

been largely responsible for the era of fear in the So
viet Union and who greatly contributed to international
distrust, was now gone, leaving behind dangerous issues
unresolved and paranoid stereotypes firmly implanted in
the minds of both nations.

Stalin's legacy also included

certain patterns of political behavior that proved hard
to overcome.

During the 24 years of his rule, the Soviet

Union was completely closed from the rest of the world.
With the exception of a small number of diplomats, few
people ever entered or left the country.

Stalin himself

almost never traveled outside the Kremlin or his dacha.
He never went abroad with the exception of the Tehran and
Potsdam Conferences during the World War II.
he was very rarely seen by the public.

In general,

He shrouded him

self in a divine-like mystery, appearing on the Red
16

17

Square podium only twice a year during major national
He stopped calling the Party Congresses and

holidays.

rarely made speeches.

On the rare occasions when he did

address the people, he spoke slowly with each word
carrying the weight of the final and ultimate truth.

He

exterminated most of his former comrades in arms and ereated one of the strongest personality cults the world had
ever known.

He was seen as the "father," "the genius of

all nations," 13 the savior of the nation from the Nazis,
the national hero, and the ultimate authority on virtually everything.

His death shook the Soviet people and

concerned the rest of the world since it marked the end
of an era.

There could not have been another Stalin and

so change was inevitable.

Many Soviets felt that they

had lost the ground under their feet, and it was this uncertainty that contributed to the grief over Stalin's
death. 14

For the world outside the USSR the question was

what the new era would be like and who would be its central force.
13

Another cliche referring to Stalin widely used in the
USSR.
14

I.Puchkov, Interview by T.Puchkova, 1998.

The Soviet face of this new force was as natural as
it was different.

The leader now was a short, fat, bold

man who looked more comical than dignified, lived in a
Moscow apartment rather than within Kremlin walls, loved
to meet and chat with ordinary people, and made frequent
and often unrehearsed passionate speeches wherever he
went.

He exemplified such a contrast to the stereotype

of the leader that existed in the Soviet Union that the
reaction of Soviet people to his personality and his
policies was very complex and often contradictory.

On

the one hand, the nation could finally exhale after dec
ades of overwhelming fear that filled each step and every
moment.

The unreachable genius was replaced with a "guy

next door", accessible, simple and uncomplicated in his
ways.

His jokes and manners were easy to understand and

identify with; his language, full of stylistic and gram
matical mistakes, was the language of the majority of
people in the country.

He was a commoner who seemed to

love and care about the concerns and well being of other
commoners.

He was both a peasant and a worker who used

to work in the coal mines and who also knew how the crops
were growing.

He also seemed to exude honesty and sin-

18

cerity, to everyone's astonishment admitting his own mis
takes as well as the wrongdoing of the Party.

On the

other hand, the latter put many in the nation in a state
of shock.

Despite the fear and repressions, the majority

of the population had no doubt that Stalin was the icon,
the National Hero who saved the country in the World War
II, "the genius of all the mankind.u 15

The public expos-

ing of Stalin's personality cult by Khrushchev caused
in many pain and disbelief. 16

Those who were convinced

that Khrushchev was right about the past began to re
evaluate their loyalties and convictions.

The new open-

ness and self-criticism, as limited, as it seems now,
were both revolutionary and dangerous in the opinion of
some, and for most the change was as welcomed as it was
feared.
Unlike Stalin, Khrushchev traveled constantly both
within and outside the country.

In the USSR he visited

plants and collective farms, military units and construc
tion sites.

Despite the fact that he also was a product

15

Another cliche referring to Stalin widely used in the
USSR.
16

At the XXth Party Congress in 1956 Khrushchev denounced
Stalin's personality cult and admitted that the Communist
Party made a number of mistakes under Stalin's rule.

19

of the Stalinist mold and time, and as such, had blood
and dirt on his hands, he did have an internal sense of
justice and fairness and sincerely wanted to improve the
life of the nation.

In his numerous travels and conver

sations he saw the necessity of major·political and eco
nomic changes.

He was a firm believer that socialism was

the only fair and economically sound system and that it
would inevitably replace capitalism around the world as a
more progressive society. 17

But Khrushchev also clearly

saw the backwardness of the Soviet Union that, in many
respects had to be overcome.

The country with enormous

territory, resources and human potential that emerged out
of the World War II victorious, had inadequate housing,
medical care, infrastructure and service sector.

It had

a lower standard of living than recently defeated Ger
many, and much lower than the Soviets' main enemy, the
United States.
To overcome its ills and to fulfill its historic ob
ligation of leading the world to communism, Khrushchev
believed the Soviet Union had two main goals.

One was

the strengthening of its position in the world and ensur-

17

S. Khrushchev, 1991.

20

ing the impregnability of its military defenses.
goal was a Damoclean sword for the USSR.

18

This

Surrounded by

the US military bases it was easily reachable for the
American medium-range missiles and strategic aviation
based there.

At the same time the Soviet Union had no

way of surrounding the United States with the missiles
and did not have missiles capable of crossing the Atlan
tic.

Thus, not only the position of the Soviet State was

extremely vulnerable and humiliating, but also it was di
minishing its power of making and enforcing political de
cisions in the international arena.

The other goal was

rapidly to develop the industrial, agricultural and serv
ice sectors of the Soviet economy, making it the model
society a socialist state was meant to be.

The striving

towards these goals had an inherent economic contradic
tion.
Inevitably, the economy of any country would be
forced to pursue one of these goals at the expense of
other.

The armaments put a great strain on the United

States and other Western powers.

However, the economy of

the Soviet Union that laid in ruins after the war, whose

18

N. Khrushchev, 1974, 11.

21

labor force was lost in battle and whose technology was
still lagging behind the West, simply could not handle
the expense of both reconstructing the economy and keep
ing pace with the arms race.

The idea of restraining and

reshaping the latter began to loom on the horizon.

22

CHAPTER III
OLD PROBLEMS, NEW APPROACHES
Despite his often caricature image that existed in
side and outside the USSR, Khrushchev was not just an im
pulsive fool who made serious decisions on a whim and
whose mood swings determined his policies.

Lacking expe

rience and knowledge in many fields, including interna
tional politics, he had intuition that often made him
more insightful than most economic, political and mili
tary leaders around him.

He was criticized by many in

the Party leadership for his denunciation of the Stalin's
cult that was believed to split the unity of the Party
and discredit it before the nation, his attempt to reor
ganize the economy by giving more decision-making power
to regional authorities, his liberalism that supposedly
led to the Hungarian revolt in 1956, and the forced res
ignation of Marshall Zhukov, who was most beloved by the
nation and the army. 19

Khrushchev was well aware that

19

Zhukov, the leading Soviet commander of the WWII, became
a member of the Presidium in 1957. His immense popularity
in the military and his assumption of too much power led
his colleagues to believe that he was planning a coup
d'etat. He was removed from the Presidium that same year.
23

the introduction of the reforms put him on very thin
ice.20

But his intuition was telling him that the change

was absolutely necessary if the Soviet Union and world
socialism wanted to survive and win.

Just as he realized

in domestic policy that he had to end unproductive slave
labor, in international politics he realized that accumu
lating traditional weapons in large quantities was ham
pering the country's development and setting it further
back.
He, of course, had no doubts that the USSR had to be
militarily invincible, but he was determined to accom
plish it by different means.

Khrushchev was certain that

in case of another world war the traditional naval, air,
and surface forces would be almost useless.

He vividly

remembered a major strategic mistake Stalin made by un
derestimating the crucial role of aircraft and submarines
in the World War II when he counted mostly on the navy.21
Despite his limited understanding of many military tech
nicalities, Khrushchev understood the trends of future
military developments.

In general, one of his main mer-

20

Alexey Adzhubey, Interview by G.Colburn, 1991.

21

N. Khrushchev, 1974, 19-34.
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25

its as a political leader was having a vision and
approaching all issues from a broad futuristic perspec
tive.

Even though this often led him to utopian plans

and mistakes in the short run, it produced many signifi
cant initiatives and political breakthroughs, and changed
history in the long run.

He came to believe that the So

viet Union had to concentrate on the development of both
tactical and strategic missiles that within seconds would
be able to reach any part of the Globe.

In his view,

once the Soviet Union had a missile arsenal, it would not
need most conventional weapons and a large army that
would become obsolete. 22
It was these efforts to create a missile force that
the West always threw in Khrushchev's face as proof of So
viet hypocrisy when he talked about disarmament.

However,

Khrushchev believed that the Soviet Union needed its missile arsenal in order to prevent the next World War.

The

Soviet military at that time admitted that if America at
tacked the Soviet bloc, the USSR could respond in Europe,
but the US itself would not be harmed.

Therefore, Khrush

chev was sure that once the Soviet Union developed its own
Georgiy Grechko, Roald Sagdeyev, Interview by G. Col
burn, 1991.

22

Intercontinental missiles and the US didn't feel secure
anymore, America would be much more careful and cautious
deciding whether or not to start a war.

This approach is

one more proof of the tragic political paradox of that
time - the unshakable assumption of both the USA and the
USSR that sooner or later the other side would certainly
initiate a war.
This need to get rid of the haunting Stalinist past
and build socialism with a more human face, to improve
the Soviet economy and to secure world peace that would
allow socialism to prosper and prove its worth, made
Khrushchev realize the urgent need of peaceful co
existence with the West.

He was determined to prevent a

new war and believed that any means that would accomplish
that were appropriate.

He was ready to apply political

pressure in Berlin, confuse, threaten, or politically
bribe both the foes and allies when necessary, and, most
importantly, to negotiate, to open a dialog with the en
emy, all of which comprised a revolutionary approach in
the history of the Cold War.

It is this readiness to mix

and match any means necessary that provides a key to his
often contradictory, passionate, aggressive, and seem
ingly bizarre behavior with the Western counterparts that

26

27

so often confused and aggravated them.
Khrushchev's political credo became a double-edge
sword doomed to undercut the interests of different po
litical groups both inside and outside the USSR.

His si

multaneous attempts to build up Soviet rocketry and to
soften the international atmosphere through negotiation
were an extraordinary complex balancing act that, by
definition, could not completely satisfy either political
force.

In the West his talks about peaceful co-existence

were seen as a political maneuver that would undermine
American state of alert and give the Soviet Union more
time to prepare for war.

At home his policy alienated

the hard-liners and the military.

The majority in Soviet

Armed Forces that remained enormous after the end of the
World War II were facing major cuts in staff and expendi
tures with very unclear prospects about their future
status, role and employment.

At the same time the mili

tary staff involved in constructing a missile arsenal
were eager to test it and saw the idea of promoting peace
as undermining their very reason for existence. 23 The
hard-liners, who, as mentioned earlier, blamed Khrushchev
for previous Party-discrediting policies, considered that
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the idea of negotiating with the West was as ridiculous
as it was criminal.

In their view the West would cer

tainly deceive the USSR, which would weaken the Soviet
status in the eyes of both its friends and its enemies,
loose its grip on the socialist and developing countries,
and make it vulnerable.

Moreover, it would shake the

prestige of the Party and socialism in general within the
nation, exhibiting its economic and political weaknesses.
However, the need for major changes in international
situation was apparent in the US as well.

Though with

opposition, internal contradiction, and inconsistency,
the idea of co-existence was working its way in the US as
it was in the Soviet Union.

When in July 1955 the lead

ers of the US, USSR, Britain, and France met in Geneva
for the first time since the end of the war, the atmos
phere of peaceful negotiation raised international hopes.
Even though the Geneva summit took place only months af
ter the acceptance of FRG into NATO and the formation of
the Warsaw Pact, and even though it didn't produce reso
lution to the German or any other major touchy issue that
existed among the four powers, the conference was viewed
as a success.

The world began to talk about "the spirit

of Geneva" that instilled hope in achieving political re-
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sults by means of peaceful negotiations.
It was in Geneva that President Eisenhower and
Nikita Khrushchev talked for the first time, although
Khrushchev had seen Eisenhower at the Victory parade in
Moscow in June 1945 before both of them became national
leaders.

Later, the Soviet Premier recalled that this

first positive impression of Eisenhower never changed,
despite all the tensions and incidents that happened be
tween the two countries later.
President Dwight Eisenhower indeed deserves much
credit for the turn in Cold War thinking.

It is remark

able that Eisenhower, a professional military man, was
one of the first politicians who not only realized the
burning need to secure peace, but had the vision and
courage to try unpopular and unprecedented ways of accom
plishing it.

In this respect, Eisenhower, like Khrush

chev, was ready not only to apply military pressure, but
also to find venues of cooperation through open dialog in
order to achieve a larger goal.

Like Khrushchev, he also

felt, more intuitively than rationally, that there had to
be ways of talking to the other side and finding compro
mises, and that one of the main obstacles was lack of in
formation, and, consequently, understanding of each
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other.
The records of events that took place in the US and
Soviet leadership in the 1950s make clear how strikingly
similar the problems of understanding the opposite side
were.

Despite the efforts of their respective intelli

gence, both the US and the Soviet Union knew surprisingly
little of each other's mentality, culture, and internal
balance of forces, and more often than not interpreted
the information incorrectly.

It was largely these dis

tortions, combined with the long-established stereotypes
and habitual reactions to any action or idea of the other
side, that brought the world so close to a global war.
The immense historical contribution of both Khrushchev
and Eisenhower was to be among the first to understand
this and to attempt to change the pattern despite the
odds against them and at the cost of possibly loosing
power and the trust of their followers. Such was the po
litical atmosphere that preceded Khrushchev's visit to
the USA.
The political changes, without a doubt, had certain
economic stimuli for both sides.

As mentioned earlier,

the financial pressures of the arms race were enormous.
Besides, the economy of each country had to support po-

litical statements with practical actions.

That led to

economic boycotts and an embargo at the time when America
and the USSR needed active trade to compensate for the
costs of the Cold War. 24

It also prevented the two world

giants from cooperating in the field of space exploration
as well as in almost any other area of science.

The lat

ter possibly slowed down the advancement of military
technology, completing the vicious circle.

Ironically,

the two most powerful nations in the world found themselves hostages of their own policies towards each other,
draining their own resources and dragging the rest of the
world into the abyss.
At the same time, both the US and the USSR well
realized the benefits of economic and cultural cooperation, and in the "spirit of Geneva" made remarkable attempts to enhance it.

After 1955 America was flooded

with different kinds of Soviet delegations.

It was

Khrushchev's personal initiative to send to the US Soviet
doctors, agronomists, builders, architects and actors.
As a practical economist Khrushchev was well aware of the
fact that the USSR lagged behind the US in many areas. By
4

The US boycotted Soviet goods and imposed an embargo
on trade with the USSR (Khrushchev 1974, 369).
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exchanging specialists he was hoping to get tremendous
benefits for the Soviet economy and to improve the po
litical climate in the meantime. 25
One of Khrushchev's merits was his diverse personal
experience in the most practical matters of industry and
agriculture.

For instance, in 1934 he worked at the con

struction of the Moscow subway where several American en
gineers worked as consultants.

It was then he learned to

value American engineering·•expertise and years later en
couraged engineering exchanges between the two countries.
When in 1958 the World Industrial Exhibition started its
work in Brussels, hundreds of Soviet engineers, econo
mists and administrators were sent there on Khrushchev's
personal initiative.
Several critical exchanges between the two countries
occurred in 1959.

The most significant one was the

American National Exhibition that took place in July in
Moscow.

The Exhibition was opened by Vice-President

Nixon, and displayed a large variety of American consumer
goods.

Despite the image Khrushchev created in his mem

oirs, the exhibition had a profound effect on the Soviet
public and possibly on Khrushchev himself.
2
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That was the
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first time an average Soviet person saw, in miniature,
the American life-style.

The people, who lived in primi

tive communal apartments, never owned a car and couldn't
even imagine that a car could be any color other than
black, saw American kitchen gadgets and household appliances, gorgeous cars and neon lights of billboards, and
most importantly, were told that every American family
could enjoy them.

Considering the interest of Khrushchev

in raising the consumer living standard, his technical
inclination and practical approach to economic matters,
it is likely that Khrushchev saw in the exhibition one
more proof of the Soviet inferiority in consumer economy
and the need for cooperation with America.

Perhaps, it

is this feeling of economic inferiority combined with im
mense political pride for other socialist advancements,
that made him passionately challenge Nixon during the famous "kitchen debate." 26
The other important exchange took place in the
spring of 1959 when a delegation of American industrial26

In the section of the exhibition that imitated an aver
age American kitchen Nixon and Khrushchev engaged in a
heated debate. The argument started with the usefulness
of American kitchen appliances and proceeded to the dis
pute of the different roles of women in the USA and the
USSR.
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ists came to tour shipbuilding industries of the USSR.
When First Deputy Premier Kozlov with a group of Soviet
engineers went to the USA on a reciprocal visit in June,
he was asked to deliver a message to Nikita Khrushchev
from President Eisenhower that as it turned out, con
tained the invitation for the Soviet Premier to pay a
friendly visit to the USA.

The reaction to the invita

tion and the preparations for the visit are perfect il
lustrations of the concerns and misconceptions of the
Cold War at its peak.

34

PART TWO
THE VISIT
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CHAPTER I
THE ISSUES
The invitation came as a complete surprise for
Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership.

In his own admis

sion, Khrushchev believed he had no reason ever to expect
such an invitation since the relations of both sides had
been extremely strained and America was boycotting the
Soviet Union politically and economically.

He and the

leadership were now torn between several explanations of
the change.

One was the possible shift in the US public

opinion that pushed the American President to improve re
lations with the USSR.

The second was that the US was

preparing a set up for the Soviet leader in order to
somehow compromise or humiliate him in America.

Another

possibility was a new political game that the West was
playing, the exact goals and methods of which were un
clear.

The idea that, like Khrushchev, the President

also could be looking for the ways of cutting military
spending and preventing a war was inconceivable in the
USSR in 1959.

The obscurity of the US motivations for
36

the visit led Khrushchev and his Party colleagues to have
mixed feelings.

On the one hand, he was extremely proud

of the invitation.

The fact that the President of the

richest capitalist country in the world was inviting him,
a son of uneducated peasant and the leader of a socialist
state, to come on an official visit to the US, was a sign
of the highest respect and recognition of him personally
and the socialist world in general.

It convinced him

even more that Soviet Union had turned from a country
that had not been even recognized by the West for years
into a leading world power whose role would continue to
increase.27

On the other hand, he was very uneasy and

even afraid of the trip.

This fear was twofold.

Part of

it was his uncertainty if such a half-literate common guy
as he would be able to deal with the spoiled and polished
political elite of the West without making a fool of him
self.28

This was especially worrying the Soviet Premier

in the light of the enormous international attention the
visit would undoubtedly attract.

To an extent it was the

legacy of Stalin's personality cult that was responsible
27 A. Adzhubey, Litsom k Litsu (Moscow: Izdatelstvo
Polticheskoy Literatury, 1960), 10-18.
28 Oleg Grinevsky, Tisyacha I Odin Den Nikity Ser
geyevicha (Moscow: Vagrius, 1998), 30.
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for this concern.

Stalin used to keep a monopoly on the

international politics issues, not letting even his clos
est advisers to get involved.

He often repeated to the

rest in the Soviet leadership that without him they would
never be able to stand up to the imperialist forces, that
they would instantly get confused and wouldn't be able to
defend their land. 29

Even though by 1959 Khrushchev had

traveled to a number of Asian countries and to Britain,
it was the pending visit to the US that made him nervous
of Stalin's prediction.

The other worry was the possi

bility of a provocation on the part of the US and Soviet
helplessness to prevent it because of the lack of infor
mation.
One example illustrates the general level of dis
trust, fear and misinformation especially well.

The pre

liminary schedule of the visit that was sent to Khrush
chev from the White House mentioned that for several days
the two leaders would conduct one-on-one negotiations at
Camp David.

This caused confusion and chaos in the So

viet leadership.

Incredibly, no one in the Kremlin, the

Ministry of Defense, Intelligence Service and even the

L�
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Soviet Embassy in Washington knew what Camp David was.
Since the word "camp" in the Soviet Union was associated
with either a military station or a forced labor camp,
Khrushchev and his advisors feared it could be a dump
that was chosen to humiliate the Soviet delegation.

It

took a special effort of the Ministry of International to
clarify the situation.

All in all, the Soviet side made

many inquiries and demands to ensure that Nikita Khrush
chev would be received with respect and all official honors. 30
The most important concerns both the US and the USSR
had, however, were the issues to be discussed.

Even

though the visit had no specific official goal besides
seeing the USA, both Eisenhower and Khrushchev were plan
ning to use the opportunity to discuss a number of prob
lems one-on-one.

It was especially important in prepara

tion for the new summit between the US, USSR, France and
Britain scheduled for the following year in Paris. 31
Remarkably, the approaches of the two leaders to the
main political issues had many more similarities than it
30
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The summit of Britain, France, the US and the USSR was
planned for May, 1960.
31
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was commonly believed.

One such issue was disarmament.

The idea of disarmament was raised on the international
level years before the appearance there of Eisenhower and
Khrushchev.

The Soviet Union was the first country to

propose general and complete disarmament before the League
of Nations in the 1920s.

However, even in the USSR the

idea was generally viewed by specialists as merely a
propagandist trick, and in fact, was one.

But in the late

1950s it was beginning to seem more and more appealing to
both Khrushchev and Eisenhower.

The question was how to

accomplish it without being cheated or losing prestige by
"giving in u to the enemy.

Like most political issues of

the time, ultimately, the main problem was that of trust.
Being harder pressed economically Khrushchev stood for im
mediate general and complete disarmament, disbandment of
national armies, and the retaining of only small militia
units for keeping internal order.

Naturally, this would

include the withdrawal of American and Soviet troops from
any other countries and dismantling both the NATO and War
saw Pact alliances.

The idea was revolutionary and

Khrushchev anticipated that it would not find understand
ing

in the world.

Later, in his memoirs he admitted:
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"Actually, we knew that the conditions for such an agree
ment were not yet ripe and that our proposal was prema
ture.

In fact, our proposal was intended to serve a

propagandistic, rather than a realistic, purpose"
(Khrushchev, 1974, 410).

Nevertheless, Khrushchev be-

lieved there was still a small chance the proposal might
find approval, in which case it would have provided auto
matic solutions for most important US-Soviet and other
international problems, including those in Europe.
Khrushchev believed that if general and complete disarma
ment was accepted as a serious program of actions, then
both sides could freely allow international inspections
on their territory.

He therefore was planning to voice

it as an official Soviet proposal in the United Nations
and in his talks with Eisenhower during the visit to the

us.
The problem of disarmament was closely related to
another issue vital to the USSR: US military bases in
Europe.

Since Khrushchev realized that complete disarma

ment would unlikely find support, one of the issues he
was going to raise with President Eisenhower was liqui
dation of the US bases the existence of which prompted
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the USSR to accelerate the arms race.

Knowing that

Eisenhower also was considering the disarmament, though
on a limited and gradual level, Khrushchev was going to
demand the removal of the bases as the main condition of
disarmament.

The argument was that it would be impossi

ble for Khrushchev to convince the Soviet nation to dis
arm with American military bases surrounding the coun
try.32

The other unvoiced logic in this matter was

Khrushchev's attempt to protect himself from internal op
position by pointing out that it was the US who yielded
to the Soviet demands and not vice verse.
It remains unclear how well the President of the US
understood the internal pressure Khrushchev faced and,
consequently, the roots of his initiatives.

However,

Eisenhower himself was inclined if not to liquidate, then
to at least limit the growth of the US bases in Europe.
On the eve of the visit the President was struggling over
"thinking of something that wouldn't look as if we are
giving in, but nothing comes to mind" (Grinevsky, 1998,
20).

One of the ideas that the President was considering

was the reduction of the number of medium-range missiles

32 A. Adzhubey, 1960, 57.
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in Europe.
Khrushchev.

His rationale was very similar to that of
Since he also believed that future wars

would depend mostly on the intercontinental missiles, it
seemed to be unreasonable to increase the arsenal of me
dium-range missiles in Europe, incurring high expenses
and further aggravating the Soviet bloc.

Specifically,

Eisenhower wanted to prevent the tactical missile expan
sion into Greece and Turkey.

However, this idea of

Eisenhower met strong opposition from the Secretary of
Defense Neil McElroy and Under Secretary of State Douglas
Dillon.

Both of them tried to convince Eisenhower that

first of all, the USA couldn't afford to give Soviet Un
ion any concessions, and secondly, that the US would en
counter serious problems in Europe if it treated Greece
and Turkey differently than other allies.

Eventually

Eisenhower settled for a half-way policy of not including
the issue of European missiles into possible concessions
to Khrushchev, but at the same time postponing the mis
sile stationing in Greece anyway. 33
The US, however, did not oppose disarmament.

But it

did not believe that Soviet Union could be trusted and

.:u
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viewed the suggestion of a general and complete disarma
ment as an empty declaration.

On its part, the US pro

posed gradual and partial disarmament with international
control on each party's territory.

Specifically, the US

insisted on an agreement that would allow both sides to
conduct reconnaissance flights over each other's territo
ries.

The USSR considered this to be, first of all, a

way for a legalized espionage, and, secondly, an unequal
arrangement.

At that time America was in a much stronger

position than the Soviet Union in regards to both the
number of nuclear weapons it had and also their delivery
system.

Besides, the USSR was surrounded with US mili

tary bases including air bases while Soviet airplanes
could not even reach the US.

Finally, the US could use

its bases in Europe for mounting the instruments that
would detect atomic testing on the Soviet territory, but
the USSR had no similar opportunity.

In short, this idea

of an "open sky" in the Soviet view would give the US an
opportunity to catch up in its less advanced areas of
military technology, putting the USSR at a disadvantage,
which might tempt the West to attack.

The Soviet Union

insisted on the large-scale international inspections
only applicable to complete and not selective disarma-
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ment.
Searching for the possible points of agreement,
Eisenhower came to believe that the issue of Berlin was a
possibility.

Berlin was located on the territory of the

newly developed German Democratic Republic (GDR) and re
mained a divided city between the Western allies and the
USSR.

The situation was not only abnormal but also very

dangerous for both the FRG and the GDR, as well as the
rest of Europe.

The Soviets viewed West Berlin as a

"bone in the throat" of the socialist GDR, while the US
considered it a "hostage in Russian hands." 34

The USSR

and the US tried to resolve the problem differently.

The

US was pushing for the reunification of Germany on the
basis of free elections, knowing well that the better de
veloped economically and numerically larger FRG would
"swallow" the GDR without a trace.
to Khrushchev.

This was also obvious

The Soviet Union declared that it also

stood for the unification of Germany, but on completely
different terms.

The USSR demanded that the GDR and the

FRG form a confederation and have equal representation in
the confederated government.
34
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Realizing that such posi-

tion would never be accepted in the West, Khrushchev also
proposed another plan.

Certainly not ready to lose the

socialist stronghold in Europe, he suggested that the war
allies sign peace treaties with the two de-facto existing
states, the GDR and the FRG, and that Berlin would be
given a status of "free city."

In reality, both sides

understood that there was no room for compromise in these
positions on Germany.

The US knew that under no circum

stances the Soviet Union would agree to unification
through free elections.

In fact, there are many indica

tions that by 1959 the US leadership had almost recon
ciled with the fact that Germany would never be unified
since the division went too far, but kept fighting this
battle for obvious political reasons. 35
The status of Berlin, however, was a different
story.

West Berlin was the only outlet the three allied

powers had in Eastern Europe.

If the GDR couldn't be

swallowed then at least through West Berlin it was possi
ble to gather intelligence information on the Soviet
block, flood the latter with information about the West,
and in general exercise some control over the Warsaw Pact
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nations, breaching the Iron Curtain and undermining the
Soviet position.
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Khrushchev also realized that the exis

tence of West Berlin was weakening Soviet position in
Europe and in general hampering the prospects of social
ist expansion in the region.
In November 1958 the Soviet Union announced that if
the Western allies did not sign the peace treaties with
the GDR and the FRG and accept the free status of Berlin
in six months, the USSR would end the four-power occupa
tion of Berlin and would hand control of East Berlin and
the routes leading into West Berlin over to the East Ger
mans.

The clear implication was that in the future free

access to Berlin would require that the West powers deal
directly and officially with the East German Government.
That would completely squeeze the Western powers out of
the socialist bloc, force them to recognize the official
existence of East Germany and abandon the two million
population of West Berlin that would be immediately incor
porated into GDR.

In turn, that would undermine the faith

of Germans and other Europeans in the power of the US and
its willingness to honor its commitments, and might force
many of them to negotiate with the USSR as the only re
maining alternative.

In other words, it would mean a sig-

nificant defeat for the US economically and politically
both in the short and long run.
At the same time, the choice for the US response was
very limited.

Despite the policy of brinkmanship con

ducted by John Foster Dulles and the earlier threats of
retaliation by Truman, neither Eisenhower nor Truman at
any time intended to precipitate a total nuclear war.
The original calculation was that lagging behind the
West in the arms race and surrounded by the military
bases in Europe the Soviet Union would be cautious in
its European politics fearful of the nuclear retaliation
by the US.

But by the late 1950s the balance of power

was altered since the USSR had both the nuclear bomb and
its own intercontinental missiles.

Now the question was

if the United States was ready to unleash a possible nu
clear war and suffer inevitable damage on its own terri
tory just to protect its political position in Europe
and keep its commitments to the Allies.

Eisenhower un

derstood that the Soviets had reasons to view Western
actions in Europe as a direct threat to their survival,
and, in general, had a lot more at stake in Europe than
the US did.

In the words of Henry Kissinger:
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Every move on its [Soviet bloc's] part will then
pose the appalling dilemma of whether we are
willing to commit suicide to prevent encroach
ments, which do not, each in itself, seem to
threaten our existence directly but which may be
steps on the road to our ultimate destruction. 36
The Berlin crisis was thus the test of postwar American
policy.
President Eisenhower believed that the formation of
West Berlin was a serious miscalculation on part of the
Western Allies.

Later he would say, "The Western World

made a mistake in 1944-1945 and now has to find a way to
pay for it." 37 Gradually he began to consider different
options of creating a "free city of Berlin" under the
aegis of the United Nations and with a guaranteed inter
national access to it.

The problem was finding a way of

making concessions to the Soviet Union without making
them look as such.
There are reasons to believe that Khrushchev, however, underestimated the willingness of the US to com
promise or disregarded its value.

Plus, he also was de

termined to continue making political capital by de
nouncing the US position as the occupant in Europe.
36
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same way as the White house, despite its demands for the
unification, de-facto reconciled with the existence of
two German states, the USSR, despite its declared goal
of official recognition of two Germanies and creation of
free Berlin, was ready to continue the status quo.

In

fact, since the Soviet demands on Germany and Berlin
couldn't be accepted on Khrushchev's terms anyway, the
existing status of Berlin provided the USSR with an
ever-present leverage of pressure on the USA.

Offi

cially, of course, both Eisenhower and Khrushchev con
tinued their uncompromising political lines, privately
hoping that the visit of the Soviet Premier to the US
would at least give them the chance to discuss the is
sues without outside pressure.
This factor, indeed, is one of the keys to under
standing Soviet-American relations in the Cold War.
Very often the analysis of these relations focuses on
the intentions and actions of the two countries, and
doesn't give serious enough consideration to the other
players in that game.

The role of the latter could be

less obvious but it was crucial.

The policies of Euro

pean countries, and especially those of Britain, France,
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and West Germany, and their attitudes towards each
other, the Soviet Union, and the USA, had a significant
impact on the development and the scale of the US-USSR
confrontation.
West Germany took the most rigid stand on the future
of Germany and Berlin.

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was a

clever, disciplined, and strong politician who enjoyed
the overwhelming support of West Germans.

The centu

ries-old German contempt of Russians and the historic
animosity between the two nations multiplied by the hu
miliating defeat in the war and the expansion of the so
cialist system produced this uncompromising attitude to
wards the Soviet Union.

In the view of Germans, ideally

USSR had to vanish from the face of the planet, but at
the very least had to be contained and constantly kept
in check.
Adenauer was a loud voice for such thinking.
Western Germany readily cooperated with Britain, US, and
even the hated France if it meant restraining the USSR.
Adenauer also was a firm believer in a unified Germany,
certainly on Western terms.

He immediately denied all

Soviet proposals on the German question and warned the
Allies that a demonstration of Western weakness in Ber-
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lin would set in motion a chain of events that would be
disastrous for all of Europe: the dissolution of Ger
many's links to Western Europe, the disintegration of
NATO, and Soviet domination of Europe.
Both the US and the USSR were especially concerned
with Adenauer's position on nuclear armament. In the
late 50s, the Bundeswehr was still in its embryonic
state.

It consisted of slightly more than 80,000 sol

diers.

At the time, Adenauer clearly saw that the bal

ance of the armed forces in Europe was not favorable to
the West.

The situation further escalated when in 1956,

just when the USSR crushed anti-socialist uprising in
Hungary, the US under the domestic pressure "to bring
the boys home" in the aftermath of the World War II, an
nounced its plans to cut the number of its troops sta
tioned in Europe.

The understandable but unexpected re

action of Adenauer put the USSR, the US, Britain, France
and the rest of Europe in a state of shock.

In 1957 the

Chancellor announced that the Bundeswehr was planning to
acquire its own medium-range nuclear weapons.

Both

Britain and France feared that this decision was a be
ginning of the preparation to a third World War started
by Germany in this century.

Consequently, the Allies

52

pressured the US to change Adenauer's mind by promising
Germany more NATO support in Europe.
Khrushchev quickly understood Adenauer's flawless
calculation, and on the eve of his visit to the US de
cided to use his own stick and carrot with the Chancel
lor.

His passionate official letter to Adenauer began

by stating the firm position of the USSR on confedera
tion of the two German states and free Berlin, and the
threat that if this plan were not accepted, the USSR
would sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR.

How

ever, the blackmail was further sweetened with the prom
ises of benefits.

If the Chancellor agreed to the So

viet terms, Khrushchev would open the venues of economic
cooperation with Germany.

Besides, he added, Adenauer

would go down in history as the noble and insightful
leader who ended the Cold War.

In his letter Khrushchev

also planted a seed of distrust between the Western Al
lies:

"We give tremendous importance to the approaching

negotiations with the American President," he wrote.
"Possibly, they will lead to breakthrough in the rela
tions between the two superpowers."

That was a trans

parent hint that the German question could be solved be-
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hind Adenauer's back in Camp David.

54

38

A similar approach was tried with France and Britain.

Even though neither of the two was interested in

the strengthening of Germany's position in Europe, the
threat of Socialist expansion seemed to outweigh the
German danger.

The positions of both France and Brit

ain, therefore, were far from solid.

France had been

always fearful of Germany expansion, and, to a degree,
was interested in a divided, and consequently, weaker
Germany.

Despite that fact, however, France chose a

policy of supporting German unification.

President de

Gaulle had a vision of a unified Europe in the future,
even though in his plan it was going to be France and
not Germany that would play the key role in the region.
The deepening division of Europe along the socialist
capitalist line was making that future less and less
possible. 39
The view of Britain was somewhat different.

First

of all, geographically Britain was not in such a close
contact with the East as France or Germany and was not
Khrushchev wrote the letter in August 1959 while pre
paring to the visit to America.
38
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concerned with the border issues as much.

But it was ex

tremely concerned with the possibility of a purposeful or
accidental nuclear war that would certainly reach Brit
ain.

Secondly, the position of British Prime-Minister

Harold Macmillan at home was not similar to that of
Adenauer and de Gaulle in their countries.

The latter

two were national heroes who enjoyed the overwhelming
support of their nations and didn't have to worry about
losing power to the opposition party.

Britain on the

other hand was in a pre-election campaign at the time of
the 1958 Berlin crisis.

Macmillan had reasons to worry

that if he supported French and German position on Ber
lin, he would be accused of political inflexibility and
endangering British national security.

Also, the differ

ent ideological nature of the Soviet regime didn't strike
the British with the same sense of revulsion as it did
Americans.

Britain had for centuries maintained diplo

matic relations with nations whose form of government it
disapproved.

All of these factors made Macmillan advo

cate dialogue with the Russians and softening of interna
tional tensions.

Britain thus became a middleman between

the powers, encouraging Eisenhower to open that dialogue.
This and the hints of Khrushchev to the Germans and the
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French made the latter two increasingly distrustful of
the US and fearful that while the two leading powers
might arrive at a mutually beneficial agreement, the in
terests of Germany and France would most likely be be
trayed or disregarded.
Another goal that Khrushchev was hoping to achieve
during his visit was to change American economic policy
towards the USSR.

The Soviet Premier was looking for

ward to establishing contacts with the American business
world, lifting the trade embargo against the Soviet
bloc, obtaining American credits, and beginning coopera
tion in scientific and industrial fields.
But Khrushchev's main reason for going to the US was
to reach out and start a dialogue, no matter how unpro
ductive it might be at first.

He sincerely wanted to

establish good relationship with Eisenhower and to start
cooperating.

He wanted to prove to the US that he was

not lying when proposing peaceful co-existence, and that
the USSR would keep its word once the US gave in on Ger
man and disarmament issues.

At the same time his expec

tations of the visit were not unrealistic.

He knew that

to establish the relationship of at least some mutual
understanding both sides needed a lot of time.

Khrush-
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chev was convinced that there was an enormous gap be
tween the two sides that had to be bridged but that no
body had yet even started building that bridge.

Using

the metaphor of Khrushchev's son, "He went on the visit
to find the most narrow part of the stream where the
bridge was to be built". 40

President Eisenhower also

seemed to have the same rationale for the visit.

Be

sides, he wanted to show Khrushchev how Americans really
lived.

He knew that Khrushchev wouldn't be surprised by

the construction sites and industrial giants. Eisenhower
wanted him to see that the living standard of an average
American was much higher than that of a Soviet citizen,
and that Americans freedom and democracy were real, and
not just a propaganda slogan.

40
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CHAPTER II
THE UNCHARTED TERRITORY
The visit of Nikita Khrushchev to the US lasted 13
days. 41

It included Washington, D.C., New York, Los An

geles, Hollywood, San Francisco, Iowa, Pittsburgh and
Camp David where he toured factories, farms, supermar
kets, movie studios, docks and research centers.

In the

course of the trip the Premier met with politicians,
businessmen, journalists, trade union leaders, farmers
and workers and had a series of private negotiations
with President Eisenhower.
In the United States the visit caused mixed feelings
among the general population.

For some Eisenhower's de

cision to invite Khrushchev seemed outrageous.

Khrush

chev was seen as a dictator, a ruthless conqueror of
Eastern Europe, and, most recently, a butcher of Hun
gary.

Demonstrations protesting any negotiations with

Khrushchev erupted in different areas of the country.

41

The visit took place between September 15-27, 1959.
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And yet, overall, Americans welcomed the idea.
Tired of fear and the state of constant alert, many were
hopeful that the visit was a sign of change that would
improve the international climate.

But mostly people

were curious to see what "real communists" looked like,
how they behaved, how different or similar they were
from average Americans.
Khrushchev's behavior during the visit that ranged
from openly friendly and curious to aggressive, stubborn
and even provocative reflected the complex and contro
versial position he was in.

On the one hand, he was

coming to the US to promote peace and ensure coopera
tion.

And he truly was curious about America.

Now it

is hard even to imagine that a major political leader
who had diplomatic, intelligence, and foreign affairs
services at his disposal, in reality had a very limited
and largely distorted image of the other superpower.
But it certainly was so.

Largely because of this

Khrushchev also had an inferiority complex, often not
knowing how he was supposed to behave.

On the other

hand, he was coming to his ideological enemies believing
that their system was doomed and being extremely proud
of the Soviet Union's and his personal achievements.

To

him, the fact that a backward peasant country that in a
span of 30 years rose to be the world's major superpower
and a poor shepherd boy who grew up to lead it were in
vited as equals to the world's richest country was the
best proof of socialist victory. 42
At the same time, he felt he had to exude absolute
confidence in his system and defend it viciously cover
ing up its flaws that he was painfully aware of but con
sidered temporary.

Finally, struggling with the growing

opposition in his own government that saw any compromise
with the West as betrayal, he had to return home a vic
tor whose strength and resolve forced the US to back up.
This balancing of pride and prejudice and playing a dual
act of intimidation and trust is the key to Khrushchev's
seemingly illogical behavior during and after his visit
to the US.
Ironically, the position of Eisenhower was somewhat
similar.

Proud of his nation's ideology and history,

and certain of the evil nature of socialism, he never
theless considered it crucial to reach out and negotiate
with the antagonist.

42

He too was under tremendous pres-

Khrushchev, 1974, 374.
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sure since even at the top political level in the US the
attitudes towards the contemporary international situa
tion and the future relationship between the US and the
USSR were far from uniform.

Further complicating the

situation was the frequent lack of understanding by each
side of the motives of the other.

All of those factors

put Eisenhower and Khrushchev on a path of inconsis
tency, manipulation and frequent disappointments both
during and after the visit.
It is important to remember that each side was so
affected by propaganda and ideological struggle, that
every move of the other was taken as an offense or provo
cation.

The examples of the latter can be seen through

out the visit.

For instance, American businessmen,

politicians and journalists, asked Khrushchev many ques
tions that made him furious.

Most of them dealt with

the issues of democracy, or, to be accurate, the lack
thereof in the Soviet Union.

People asking were sin

cerely indignant with the undemocratic patterns of the
USSR and certainly did not understand that the legacy of
that country made democracy impossible there in 1959.
By the same token Khrushchev could not understand that
for Americans these feelings and questions were natural,

61

and saw them as either a provocation or an attempt to
interfere in the domestic affairs of the USSR and back
Khrushchev into a corner.

His reaction to them was of

ten defensive in its motives and viciously forceful in
its form.

The latter often strengthened the conviction

of Americans in their stereotypes of the Soviet leader
and socialism in general. This pattern exhibited itself
many times during the visit.

One disappointment oc

curred at the dinner in Khrushchev's honor given by the
Economic Club in New York.

Khrushchev had high hopes

for this meeting with American business elite planning
to interest them in trading with the USSR.

But the con

versation turned into an exchange of accusations that
largely dealt with the question of democracy in Russia. 43
The most open collision, however, took place in
Los Angeles at the official dinner given by the mayor.
By that time Khrushchev already had many debates with US
politicians, businessmen and journalists, and explained
his position on a number of issues many times.

He tried

to specifically clarify his earlier expression: "We will
bury you u that had circled the world and almost caused

4

�
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panic in the US. Since then, Khrushchev returned to this
explanation many times insisting that he did not mean it
as a military threat to the US, but rather the historic
inevitability of the natural degradation of capitalism
on its own and its replacement by socialism as a more
progressive system all over the world.

When Mayor Poul

son openly provoked Khrushchev by stating that the US
would not let him bury it and that, if necessary, Ainer
ica would fight to death, the situation exploded.
Khrushchev was enraged and threatened that since the So
viet Delegation was being purposely provoked despite the
fact that the question of "burial" had been clarified
many times, it would immediately leave the US.

The in

cident had its development after dinner at the hotel
where the Soviet Delegation stayed.

There Khrushchev

gathered his party and being extremely agitated began to
shout that he would not tolerate such attitudes toward
the leader of the country and that it, probably, was
part of the US plan to put pressure on the Soviet Union
and further worsen the international situation.

The in

teresting twist of this scene was that, according to the
witnesses, as soon as Khrushchev finished it, he smiled
and silently pointed at the walls and the ceiling of the
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room, which he was sure were "bugged". Thus he was showing his frightened entourage that this little perform
ance was staged not for them, but for the ears of the UN
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, 44 the CIA, and eventually,
President Eisenhower. 45
This incident is an important key to understanding
the realities of the Soviet-American diplomacy, Khrush
chev's political line, his real character and his political persona.

Khrushchev truly believed that some

political forces in the US were putting pressure on him
to ensure his concessions during the negotiations at
Camp David and later in Paris.

He also was beginning to

understand that Eisenhower himself could not escape this
domestic pressure.

In response Khrushchev easily re

sorted to manipulation and blackmail using his worldwide
reputation of a short-fused and unpredictable politi
cian.

He was well aware of this reputation, and accord

ing to his immediate advisers, even though he really was

44

Henry Cabot Lodge, the US representative in the UN,
was Khrushchev's official escort during the visit.

45

The incident is described by Sergey Khrushchev, N.
Khrushchev's son who accompanied the Soviet Premier to
the US (S. Khrushchev, 1991).
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a very emotional person, he often played that role, pub
licly exaggerating his true feelings.
And yet, despite disappointments, offenses and
awkward situations, in general the visit was a success.
Since both Eisenhower and Khrushchev·had no illusions
that they were taking a revolutionary step that would
bring numerous difficulties, they were somewhat relieved
with both the atmosphere and the results of the visit.
Overall, Americans welcomed the Soviet delegation and
the hope of the changes the visit brought.

And overall,

Khrushchev and those who accompanied him saw Americans
as normal, friendly and sincere people who did not fit
the image of evil militarists.

It was this atmosphere

of friendliness, openness and humanity in the US that
affected Khrushchev the most.

From that time on this

image of the US became a background for his analysis of
many political moves and ideas initiated by the US. 46

46

s. Khrushchev, 1991.

65

CHAPTER III
THE RESULTS
The political accomplishments of the visit, though
seemingly incomplete at the time, were significant. Soviet
proposal at the General Assembly of the UN of the total
and complete disarmament met unanimous approval by the

representatives of all 82 of its member-countries.47 The
role of that approval by many was considered minimal
since, even though most of the countries could not vote
against such a clearly progressive proposal, they were
skeptical about its implementation.

However, the proposal

and its approval were one more push towards curtailing
the arms race on a global level.

It also provided new

leverage that both the US and the USSR could use in ap
plying mutual pressure to a number of political issues.
The negotiations at Camp David were also very impor

tant.48 The central problem discussed was the situation in
47 Khrushchev addressed the General Assembly of the UN
on September 18, 1959.

48 The talks between Khrushchev and Eisenhower took
place in Camp David on September 25-27, 1959.
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Germany.

Eisenhower and his administration had little

hopes for the pending summit of the four powers in Paris.
They believed it made no sense to go there unless some
sort of unofficial agreement on the desired outcome was
reached beforehand.

This problem became especially acute

in the light of Soviet ultimatum on Berlin.

During the

negotiations with Khrushchev, Eisenhower insisted that
the Paris meeting was out of the question unless the So
viets withdrew the ultimatum.

Khrushchev, on the other

hand, was very interested in the summit hoping to force
the three powers to sign peace treaties with both Ger
manies and withdraw from Berlin. After the most frustrat
ing and seemingly hopeless talks, progress was achieved.
President Eisenhower admitted that the situation in
Berlin was abnormal.

He agreed to discuss with the Al

lies the question of reducing troops in West Berlin as
well as terminating Western propaganda and espionage in
the GDR.

He also promised to talk France and Britain

into conducting the summit in Paris if the Soviet Union
withdrew the ultimatum.
Later Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs that Khrush
chev left the US having understood that by bullying on
the Berlin issue earlier he was asking for trouble and
was relieved when found a way out without a significant
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loss of prestige.

According to Eisenhower, the Berlin

crisis was prevented without any rights of the West being
harmed. 49
However, it does not seem to be the accurate evaluation of what happened.

Actually, by declaring the ulti

matum Khrushchev had purposely started the crisis in order to make the West give concessions.

And in his opin-

ion (as well as of many other politicians and histori
ans), he succeeded. 5 °

First of all, the very fact that

the Western powers were ready to stop any adversative activity against the GDR meant the de-facto recognition of
the latter.

Secondly, the US agreed to ensure the Paris

summit without any Soviet guarantees to its outcome,
which was an earlier condition of the US.

In return,

Khrushchev only dropped the specific term of the ultimatum, having warned Eisenhower that the issue, however,
remained to be solved sooner or later.

This explains the

frustration of Eisenhower with the Camp David negotiations, as Khrushchev later explained in his memoirs:
49

50

Grinevsky, 1998, 96.

This opinion is expressed in both Spanier's
and Grinevsky's books.
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I could tell Eisenhower was deflated. He looked
like a man who had fallen through a hole in the ice
and been dragged from the river with freezing water
still dripping off of him. Perhaps Eisenhower
had promised the ruling circles in his government
that he would reach an agreement with us, and now
his hopes were dashed. Maybe that's why he looked
so bitterly disappointed (Khrushchev, 1974, 412).
Khrushchev also was far from being euphoric after
the talks.

The question of disarmament was discussed in

the most vague and general form with no specific agree
ments reached.

Ironically, both had reached sincere

consensus on the need to curb the arms race in the nearest future.

They confessed to each other that their

respective militaries were using the fear of unequal bal
ance in weapons of the two countries and the consequent
danger of being attacked to pump enormous resources out
of the national budgets. 51

Both Eisenhower and Khrush

chev were also officers who fought in the World War II
and realized the dangers of the new war very well.

The

problem was how to turn the tide in the divided world
that by then had learned to fear and distrust the other
side, especially under the circumstances of unequal dis
tribution of forces in Europe and around the globe.

51
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In Khrushchev's words:

There was no answer at the time.

To sum up: our conversations weren't too produc
tive. In fact, they had failed. We had failed to
remove the major obstacles between us; we'd exam
ined those obstacles, but we hadn't removed them.
. . . We had lost all hope of finding a realistic
exit from the impasse our talks had led to.52
However, the significance of the Camp David talks is
better seen in perspective from our time.

Even though

both leaders struggled over the final Communique frus
trated with the absence of concrete resolutions, this
document contains a very important, maybe even revolu
tionary, thesis for that time:

"All unregulated inter

national issues have to be resolved not from the posi
tion of force, but by peaceful means - those of negotia
tion."53

This signaled a big change from the politics

"from the position of power" preached by former Secre
tary of State John Foster Dulles.
The main result of Camp David was the psychological
shift accomplished there.

For the first time, the com

plex relationship of the two superenemies acquired a
"common human bond; and the first seeds of trust were
planted, even though they produced seedlings only dee�L

N. Khrushchev, 1974, 412.

53 Joint Soviet-American Communique, September 27,
1959, A.Adzhubey, 1960, 411.
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ades later.

Arguably, for the first time, the tendency

was born to use the negotiation table not for bickering
and propagandistic declarations, but for resolution of
sharp international problems, such as Germany, disarma
ment, and nuclear tests.
Even though the questions of Germany and disarmament
were the central ones in the negotiations, many others
were discussed in Camp David.

They too did not produce

specific decisions but had both short-term and long-term
implications.

As mentioned earlier, one of the ques

tions was the method of extracting funds by the military
of both countries.

This frank conversation of the two

leaders largely opened their eyes to the similarity of
their position at home and the pressure each of them was
under.
In other words, this contributed to a better under
standing of both the scale and the specifics of the in
ternational problems.

It also brought the two men closer

together, and gave each of them hope for a more trustful
relationship in the future.

With all the differences,

the two leaders had a lot in common.

They were two eld

erly men, grandfathers, well familiar with the horrors of
the war, who searched for the new solutions to old prob-
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lems.

Despite all political maneuvers, both of them had

a strong natural sense of justice and decency.
Both of them were also somewhat sentimental.

Just

as Khrushchev passionately wanted to convince the Presi
dent that the USSR was sincere in its striving for peace
and would fulfill its commitments, Eisenhower wanted to
prove to Khrushchev that the US would never be the aggressor. 54

The President also wanted to show the Soviet

leader the friendly and prosperous America that desired
peace.

And Khrushchev eagerly responded.

Later he com-

mented that he developed tremendous respect for the
President and his country, and that the US had made a big
impression on him.

In his own words, he was delighted

when during the visit President Eisenhower referred to
him as "my friend." 55

This almost childish delight

doesn't mean that both leaders overestimated their
chances of friendship, but it certainly was a reflection
of the change in the air.
It was largely these discussion on disarmament and

Rebecca Gruver, An American History,
Wesley Publishing Company, 1976), 929.
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blackmail tactics of the military that made Khrushchev
determined to implement changes in his own country.

Soon

after his return from the US, despite the dissatisfaction
of his colleagues with this idea, he convinced his cabi
net to undertake a major reduction of the Soviet armed
forces.
In 1960 Khrushchev announced at the Session of the
Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, that as a result of
his visit to the US the clouds of the Cold War had begun
to dissipate.

He stated that while in the US he wit

nessed the breakthrough in the decades-old perceptions of
the nature and the prospects of the Soviet-American rela
tions.

The Premier declared that because of this change

the USSR would immediately reduce the size of the Soviet
Army by two thirds, saving large funds that would be used
for consumer needs.

To a great extent, it was decisions

like this, unpopular with many military and political
leaders, that predetermined his downfall four years
later...
It was at Camp David when Khrushchev invited
Eisenhower to come with his family for a reciprocal visit
to the USSR in the summer of 1960.

The Soviet Premier
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was very enthusiastic about this visit.

He suggested

that the US President spend twice as much time in the
USSR as he had spent in the States.

He also invited

Eisenhower to visit anywhere in the USSR, including the
traditionally "closed zones" of Vladivostok and Sevastopol.56

Khrushchev started large-scale preparations for

the event.

Streets were refurbished, buildings reno

vated, and new comfortable hotels and summer residences
where Eisenhower would stay were built.

Knowing that

Eisenhower was passionate about golf, a game unheard of
in Russia, Khrushchev ordered a large golf course to be
built in the vicinity of Moscow, and began to take golf
lessons himself.
The communication between the US President and the
Soviet Premier in America in 1959 had other effects as
well.

Besides specific international issues, the two

leaders discussed many other subjects that helped them
better understand each other's perspectives.

Khrushchev

especially was curious about American approach to various
political and social ideas.

He was very interested in

the American understanding of democracy and its reflec56 Major Soviet ports where Soviet fleet was stationed.
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tion in legislation.

At that time, in the aftermath of

Stalin's personality cult, he was concerned with finding
a way to reduce personal power of a leader in the Soviet
Union.

He was trying to comprehend why in the US the

President himself was unable and often unwilling to in
vent legal loopholes in order to stay in power for life,
while in the USSR the latter was always the case.

It was

these discussions with Eisenhower that after the visit
became a source of his numerous proposals to adopt amend
ments to the Soviet Constitution such as the implementa
tion of only two terms for the top leader and similar
ones. 57
Khrushchev's visit to the US also had many other
practical implications.

No matter what he said publicly,

America had made a tremendous impression on him.

In gen

eral, metaphorically speaking, in Khrushchev's soul, two
men were constantly struggling with each other.

One was

the implacable dogmatic who memorized several central
principles of Marxism and defended them with passionate
inflexibility.

It was he who made Khrushchev yell out

the most inappropriate threats, like the famous "We will
57
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bury you!"

But the other man living inside him thought

differently.

An energetic pragmatist with a strong peas

ant common sense, he dragged to his home everything he
found useful.

It was he who admired American machinery,

roads, houses, corn and stores.

That is why Nikita

Khrushchev returned to Moscow determined to implement the
best of what he saw in the US into the Soviet reality.
He certainly did not plan to change the political system,
but to advance it by improving its economic foundation.
From the US, the Soviet Premier brought new kinds of
corn, secured the American shipment of a new breed of
cows, and made preliminary arrangements for the lifting
of the US boycott of Soviet fish products.

For the first

time he saw the cafeterias and supermarkets based on
self-service and soon afterwards opened them in the So
viet Union.

He also convinced Eisenhower to exchange

specialists on a wider basis, and was planning to send
many Soviet factory managers to re-train in the US.

In

general, both the dogmatic and the pragmatic Khrushchev
were very pleased with his "discovery of America."

His

enthusiasm is best described with the following incident.
Upon his return to Moscow, according to his daily itiner
ary, he was supposed to go home, change, and get ready
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for his speech at the Palace of Sports that seated ten
thousand people.

However, when he arrived to the airport

he saw hundreds of thousands of people greeting him all
the way from the airport to the Kremlin gates.

It was a

case of sincere unrehearsed excitement of the nation that
invested many hopes in the visit.

After seeing that

Khrushchev got so enthusiastic that he changed his plan
and straight from the airport went to the Palace where he
made a three-hour long speech summarizing the results of
the visit and his impressions of the US. 58

This, perhaps,

was the official beginning of "the Spirit of Camp David."

58
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PART THREE
THE LEGACY
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Unfortunately, contrary to Khrushchev's and
Eisenhower's hope the relations between East and West af
ter 1959 did not continue consistently to improve.

On

May 1, 1960, only two weeks before the long-awaited four
power summit in Paris and six weeks before the expected
Eisenhower's visit to Russia, Soviet antiaircraft units
shot down an American U-2 reconnaissance plane that was
gathering intelligence information on Soviet missile
sites.

The incident, seen by Khrushchev as an open in

sult and a hostile attempt to undermine the spirit of
Camp David and ensure the failure of the summit, had far
reaching destructive results.

One of its most important

consequences was the failure of Khrushchev's policy in
the eyes of his nation, and most importantly, his advis
ers.

It was the final proof they needed that Khrushchev

was naive and foolish to trust the other side, that the
idea of the military reduction was fatally dangerous,
that the USSR had always to treat the West as a mortal
enemy.

The pressure was so great that Khrushchev, first

of all, began to doubt himself and his actions, and sec
ondly, was forced to reverse the direction of his policy.
Under the circumstances, the only policy he could afford
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in response to the U-2 flight was that of making propa
ganda capital on the incident.
The Paris summit that followed was a total fiasco.
Eisenhower, Macmillan, and de Gaulle did not and could
not comprehend the scale of the political change that was
quietly taking place in the Soviet Union.

Therefore,

Khrushchev's extreme behavior in Paris and his demands
there largely annoyed and surprised the Western Allies. 59
None of them knew that by the time of the summit
Khrushchev could not continue any attempts to cooperate.
In fact, in order to survive politically, he had to break
with the West in the most scandalous and open way.
Khrushchev returned from Paris largely a broken man.
Soon afterwards, the Soviet Union officially withdrew its
invitation to President Eisenhower and cancelled its earlier decision to reduce the military forces.

Thus, the

arms race got a new spin.
The Soviet Premier would later make another attempt
to negotiate with an American President.
59

In Paris Khrushchev demanded an
Eisenhower for the U-2 flight and
cident would never be repeated as
summit. Eisenhower did not offer
cotted the summit.

In 1961,

apology from President
a promise that the in
a condition for the
it and Khrushchev boy

shortly after the Bay of Pigs operation, Khrushchev met
with John Kennedy in Vienna. 60 He hoped that relatively
young and inexperienced Kennedy, weakened by the failure
in Cuba, could be forced to accept Soviet terms on
Germany, Berlin and disarmament.

By that time Khrush

chev's position in his own country did not leave him any
room for compromise.
Two months

The Vienna summit ended in a deadlock.

later Soviet Union erected the wall that separated East
and West Berlin, de-facto solving the Berlin question on
its own terms.

A year later during the Cuban missile

crisis the world would come to the final verge of the nu
clear war with both sides ready to push the button.

The

following year President Kennedy would be assassinated.
One year after that Khrushchev would be "retired" from
power by his secret opposition.

The Soviet Union as well

as Soviet-American relations would enter the "period of
stagnation" for the next twenty years.
In the short run, Khrushchev's policies both in do
mestic and in international arenas failed.

In the long

run, they planted the seeds of change in Soviet society

bu

The Vienna summit took place in June 1961.
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and in world politics.

During the reaction and stagna

tion they continued to grow and mature, pushing through
the cracks in the system, and eventually assisted in its
disintegration.

The fresh winds of the late fifties and

early sixties were never forgotten in. the Soviet nation.
It was the young people who for the first time saw for
eigners and shook hands with them at the Moscow Youth
.Festival in 1957, listened breathless to the dissipation
of the Stalin's personality cult, and passionately
greeted Khrushchev's speech after his return from the US,
who twenty years later launched the reforms that opened
the borders, broke down the Wall, and finally unified
Germany.
If nothing more, the role of Khrushchev's visit to
the US in 1959 was the first attempt to reverse the
world's politics of the deadly race and take a chance of
talking to the enemy face to face.

Just for that it de

serves respect and recognition for the two leaders.

But

the contribution it made to the world also included the
melting of stereotypes, better understanding of each
other, and the possibility of sincere conversation be
tween different sides.

Perhaps, had it not been for this

new possibility, the Cuban missile crisis would have
ended in tragedy.

For the first time, the visit gave the enemy a human
face and brought humanity into the relationship, no mat
ter how strained.

In the words of Khrushchev written

about the visit shortly before his death:
We were plowing virgin soil, so to speak; we broke
the ice which had held our relations in a paralyz
ing grip. Now it remained for our diplomats to re
move the stubborn chunks of ice from our path and
to clear the way for further improvement in rela
tions. This process continues even today (Khrush
chev, 1974, 415).
In the eyes of history it was the visit, the very fact of
which was already an agreement.
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